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Abstract 
Adding to the emerging body of research related to the current coronavirus crisis, this paper 
studies the impact of disease epidemics on the worldwide prevalence of the shadow or the 
underground economy. The informal sector undermines compliance with government regulations 
and lowers tax collections. Our main hypothesis is that epidemics positively impacts the spread 
of the shadow economy. Using data on nearly 130 nations and nesting the empirical analysis in 
the broader literature on the drivers of the shadow sector, we find that both the incidence and the 
intensity of epidemics positively and significantly contribute to the spread of the underground 
sector. Numerically, a ten percent increase in the intensity of epidemics leads to an increase in the 
prevalence of the shadow economy by about 2.1 percent. These findings about the spillovers from 
epidemics have implications for economic policies in the current times of coronavirus. 
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1. Introduction 
Economics research on the impacts of disease epidemics has existed for some time (Adda 
(2016), Becker (1990), Prior and Stanhope (1980)).1 These issues have again come to a head 
with the recent and ongoing events related to the COVID-19 virus. Whereas various disciplines 
are grappling with the unexpected scale and scope of the challenges unleashed by the 
coronavirus, there are some longer-term and less immediate consequences that are not on the 
front burners of researchers’ and policymakers’ concerns. Yet, some of these impacts could 
persist over time and have adverse spillovers on other activities, making it important that 
attention is devoted to the understanding of their influence early on. 
This paper focuses on one such possible impact of epidemics – the worldwide prevalence of 
the shadow economy.2 The shadow economy (also called the informal, underground or black 
market) persists in all nations of the world, with variations in its scope (Medina and Schneider 
(2017); Schneider and Enste (2013); Schneider et al. (2010)), as individuals and firms try to 
evade regulations and taxes. The presence of the informal sector is challenging for governments 
both because it undermines tax collections on the one hand, and adherence to regulations and 
laws, on the other hand.  Examples of shadow activities abound including under-reported income 
by businesses, repairs by unlicensed contractors, smuggling of contraband, etc. Given its 
importance and wide prevalence, a substantial body of work has emerged on the causes or 
drivers of the underground sector (see Gërxhani (2004), Goel and Nelson (2016), and Schneider 
and Enste (2000) for literature surveys). Within this spectrum of possible determinants of the 
 
1 The World Health Organization defines an epidemic as: “The occurrence in a community or region of cases of an 
illness, specific health-related behavior, or other health-related events clearly in excess of normal expectancy” 
(https://www.who.int/hac/about/definitions/en/). 
2 The shadow economy captures economic activity that is unregistered in the official economy (see Schneider et al. 
(2010) for details). 
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shadow economy, the influence of disease epidemics has not been considered and forms the 
focus of this work. 
Specifically, we use worldwide data to see how disease epidemics impact the shadow 
economy, considering both the incidence and intensity of epidemics. About fourteen percent of 
the nearly 130 nations in our sample, faced a biological epidemic from 1991-2015 
(www.cred.be; Table 1 and 1A). While the underlying source of the disaster data has broad 
information on natural and technological (manmade) disasters (The Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED (www.cred.be)), we chose to focus on biological epidemics 
because such disasters have direct relevance to the current COVID-19 crisis.3 Another advantage 
of obtaining the data from a single source is that the disasters are consistently coded (and not 
prone to media focus on only large disasters). 
Adding to the emerging body of research related to the current coronavirus crisis (Baldwin 
and Weder di Mauro (2020)), this paper studies the impact of disease epidemics on the 
worldwide prevalence of the underground economy. Due to the breakdown of efficient 
institutions and a sudden loss of employment, individuals and firms are likely to find the move to 
the underground sector attractive. The breakdown of institutions or a shift in government’s focus 
away from enforcement to finding a cure for the epidemic, lower the potential costs of 
underground operations, while the unemployed find easier entry into the informal sector. This is 
especially true when epidemics temporarily close some of the training centers for the 
unemployed to retrain and reenter the formal labor force. 
 
3 Specifically, CRED defines biological disasters as, “A hazard caused by the exposure to living organisms and their 
toxic substances (e.g. venom, mold) or vector-borne diseases that they may carry. Examples are venomous wildlife 
and insects, poisonous plants, and mosquitoes carrying disease-causing agents such as parasites, bacteria, or viruses 
(e.g. malaria)”, https://www.emdat.be/classification. 
4 
 
Berdiev et al. 
 
If it turns out that epidemics end up increasing the shadow sector, there would be a 
consequent downward impact on governments’ efforts to contain epidemics both via a resource 
constraint (low tax collections) and a lessened ability to monitor compliance with health and 
safety regulations. Moreover, to the extent that individuals are evading stay-at-home orders and 
participating in the shadow economy, this may undermine efforts to contain the spread of the 
disease. 
Key questions addressed in this research are: 
• Does the prevalence of disease epidemics significantly impact the prevalence of the 
shadow economy? 
• Are the impacts of the incidence and the intensity (diffusion) of epidemics on the shadow 
economy similar? 
Besides answering the above questions using time series data for over 125 nations, the 
analysis will draw recommendations for related policies in the times of coronavirus 
(https://www.weforum.org/agenda/archive/covid-19). Placing the formal empirical analysis 
within the significant cross-national determinants of the shadow economy, our results show that 
both the incidence and the intensity of epidemics increase the shadow economy. These findings 
withstand a series of robustness checks. 
The structure of the rest of this paper includes the literature review and hypothesis in the next 
section, followed by the empirical model, data, results, and conclusions. 
 
2. Theoretical discussion and hypothesis 
In this paper, we are interested in understanding the shadow economy’s response to 
biological disasters classified as epidemics. The onset and spread of epidemics are largely 
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uncertain so broadly speaking, one could view the analysis in the context of a shock to the 
economy, with both macro and micro implications.  In the context of the shadow economy – 
epidemics relation, one could view the macro impacts being on institutions and government 
resources, whereas the micro impacts would be individuals’ health and employment. All of these 
potentially impact propensities to operate in the underground sector.  
In particular, there are numerous channels through which one could envision how epidemics 
could impact the underground sector (https://medicalxpress.com/news/2020-05-coronavirus-
response-isnt-billion-people.html). One, epidemics impact the smooth functioning of government 
institutions – both devoted to enforcement of rules and awarding of punishments. This 
emboldens potential lawbreakers, with their potential net benefits from breaking the law 
increasing (see Becker (1968)). Two, government efforts to contain the spread of viruses create 
regional “islands” that are somewhat autonomous, again presenting opportunities for some to 
evade paying taxes or adhering to regulations. These pockets or islands are not necessarily 
created by geographic distances but might be the result of governments favoring certain areas of 
high virus prevalence (e.g., capital cities). Breakdowns in communications networks following 
epidemics might also result in such isolated areas. The presence of such pockets might engender 
barter transactions, which cannot be traced by tax officials. Third, in times of crises posed by 
epidemics, market functions are disrupted, providing opportunities for entry to unauthorized or 
shadow agents. Anecdotal evidence exists under the current COVID-19 crisis with instances of 
unauthorized (home) barber shops, in-home informal tuitions, unauthorized ambulance or taxi 
services, etc. 
Furthermore, the counter-cyclical relationship between shadow economies and formal sector 
business cycles, as shown by Elgin (2013), is likely to exist as epidemics depress the formal 
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sector. Shadow economies serve as an economic buffer to absorb the over- or under- capacity of 
the formal sector. During economic recessions, the shadow economy offers an attractive 
alternative for earning income among unemployed individuals, especially to prevent losing 
unemployment insurance benefits. In other words, unemployed individuals might prefer to work 
in the shadow sector in order to earn additional income that is concealed from the government. 
Whereas Raddatz (2007) provides evidence that epidemics lower formal economic activity, we 
argue that epidemics might drive individuals to the shadow economy. It is perhaps expected that 
the underground economy provides refuge for individuals who lose formal sector employment 
(see, e.g., Dell’Anno and Solomon (2008); Bajada and Schneider (2009)). 
One could also argue that the demand for goods and services in the shadow economy might 
rise during epidemics as economic participants are more likely to purchases goods and services 
in the shadow economy since they are, on average, less costly than formal sector goods and 
services and of similar quality (Schneider and Enste (2013)). Additionally, the shutdown 
implemented by governments following epidemics might make certain formal sector goods and 
services unattainable, thereby inducing shadow participants to step in to meet these demands. 
Another reason might be that firms may partially or fully transition to the underground sector 
in order to save resources and or cut costs. Indeed, during the current COVID-19 pandemic, 
small businesses are deciding to defy government orders to remain closed, and instead are 
continuing to serve their customers.4 Furthermore, increased demand combined with anti-price 
gouging laws that result in shortages of necessary goods and services during epidemics (e.g., 
face masks, disinfectants, etc.) offer unique opportunities for budding shadow entrepreneurs. All 
 
4 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-18/rogue-businesses-go-underground-as-covid-black-market-
takes-off.  
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of these reasons suggest that the incidence and spread of epidemics might drive individuals and 
businesses to the shadow economy.  
In addition to the tie to the shadow economy literature, this work also adds to the economics 
of epidemics (Adda (2016), Kahn (2005), Ma et al. (2020), Rasul (2020)), or more broadly, to 
the effects of macroeconomic shocks (Nov (2009)). This body of work, with a renewed focus on 
COVID-19 in recent months (see Baldwin and Weder di Mauro (2020), Jordá et al. (2020)), has 
in the past mostly focused on the impacts of specific epidemics and/or specific regions (Armien 
et al. (2008), Bloom and Mahal (1997), Folgi and Veldkamp (2019), Hasala et al. (2012), Prior 
and Stanhope (1980)). The broad consideration of various epidemics over time in regard to their 
impact on the underground economy is unique to this work. 
Based on the above discussion, we frame our main hypothesis that we test using annual data 
from a large set of nations: 
H1: Greater prevalence of disease epidemics would increase the shadow or the underground 
sector. 
To test hypothesis H1, we consider the impact of both the incidence and severity of 
epidemics on the shadow economy. Given the current COVID-19 crisis, and the worldwide 
development of the shadow economy, understanding the spillovers from epidemics on 
underground economic activity could have important implication for current economic policies. 
We turn next to the empirical model and data. 
 
3. Empirical model and data 
3.1. Empirical model 
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To test the above hypothesis and to focus on the key influence of epidemics, the general 
model to explain the size of the shadow economy for country i and time t is: 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤it = f (𝐸𝑝𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐itm, 𝐸𝐶𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎit, 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚itg, 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑘)  (1) 
 where 
i = 1,…,129 
t = 1991,…,2015 
m = EpidemINC, EpidemDIFF 
g = PolFreedom, EconFreedom 
k = BureauQual, GovtSize 
The dependent variable is the size of the shadow economy as a percent of GDP (Shadow). 
This variable is estimated by Medina and Schneider (2017) for 158 nations from 1991 to 2015. 
In this paper, we posit that the occurrence of epidemics in countries related to infectious diseases 
(i.e., bacterial, viral, fungal, and prion) has an important influence on the decision for individuals 
and firms to move underground. To account for this unique aspect, we include two variables that 
capture the incidence of the epidemics (EpidemINC) and also the diffusion of epidemics 
(EpidemDIFF). In other words, we account for both the occurrence and the severity, or intensity, 
of the epidemic on its impact on the shadow economy.  
The baseline models, which alternatively include EpidemINC and EpidemDIFF, are 
estimated using OLS and including regional fixed effects to account for region-specific 
characteristics that influence the shadow economy. 
In order to isolate the impact of epidemics on the shadow economy, we borrow from the 
extant literature and control for a variety of other factors that influence the size of the shadow 
economy (Gërxhani (2004); Goel and Nelson (2016); Schneider and Enste (2000)). In particular, 
we account for formal economic growth (ECgrowth) to account for the health of the formal 
9 
 
Berdiev et al. 
 
sector economy, the degree of freedom measured as political (PolFreedom) and economic 
(EconFreedom), and the quantity, or size, of government (GovtSize) and the quality of 
government (BureauQual). Strong economic growth in the formal sector raises the opportunity 
cost of producing underground. Greater political freedom gives the power of voice in 
encouraging elected officials to behave in a favorable way and reduce the need to exit to the 
underground sector. Likewise, more economic freedom (e.g. low taxes and regulations) in the 
formal sector diminishes the relative benefits of the underground economy relative to the formal 
economy (Berdiev et al. (2018)). The strength and quality of institutions, proxied by bureaucratic 
quality, improve the workings of the formal sector and thus reduce the impetus for underground 
activities (Dreher et al. (2009); Torgler and Schneider (2009); Berdiev et al. (2020)). Lastly, the 
size of government can have various impacts including promoting the development of the 
shadow economy if the long arm of the government encourages people to move underground, or 
decreasing the size of the shadow economy if the government uses its resources to combat 
shadow activities (Goel and Nelson (2016)). 
 
3.2. Data 
The data set is a panel of 129 countries observed annually from 1991 to 2015 – see Table 1A 
for a list of countries used in the analysis. The data is constrained by the dependent variable 
capturing the size of the shadow economy from Medina and Schneider (2017) that is available 
only from 1991 to 2015.  Still, the period of the analysis is instructive for framing policies in 
times of the current coronavirus crisis. 
The clandestine nature of the underground economy necessitates creative ways to uncover 
their activities (see Schneider and Buehn (2013) for a review). One technique used to measure 
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the size of the shadow economy that has gained popularity is the multiple indicators, multiple 
causes (MIMIC) method (Schneider et al. (2010)). The MIMIC method uses covariance 
information from several observable causal and indicator variables to estimate the latent shadow 
economy. Specifically, the MIMIC method is a structural equations model that is comprised of 
two equations, the structural model that links the causal variables to the shadow economy, and 
the measurement model that links the shadow economy to the indicator variables. Our measure 
of the shadow economy comes from Medina and Schneider (2017) who use the MIMIC method 
to provide the most recent estimates of the shadow economy for a large panel of nations. This 
estimate of the shadow economy is an improvement on the widely used measure of the shadow 
economy from Schneider et al. (2010). According to this estimate of the shadow economy, the 
average size of the shadow economy is approximately 32% of GDP with considerable variation 
across countries, with a high of 72% (Georgia) and a low of 8% (Switzerland). 
Data on epidemics related to biological disasters is from the Emergency Events Database 
(EM-DAT) from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED, 
www.cred.be). This database, which has been utilized extensively by prior studies (see, e.g., 
Kahn (2005), Raddatz (2007) and Noy (2009)), includes epidemics related to infectious diseases 
including viral, bacterial, fungal, and prion from 1900 to 2020 for 160 countries. According to 
this data set, approximately 57% of epidemics are bacterial disease, 40% are viral disease, and 
3% are parasitic disease. Among the most common epidemics were caused by Cholera, Dengue, 
and Meningococcal disease. Based on the start and end date of each epidemic identified in this 
database for each country, we create a dummy variable (EpidemINC) that is equal to one for the 
years the epidemic occurred and zero otherwise. To capture the severity of the epidemic, we also 
consider the number of people affected (EpidemDIFF), which includes 100 or more people that 
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are affected, injured or homeless as a result of the epidemic.5 Due to the number of zeros in the 
number affected, we transform this variable by adding one to all observations and then dividing 
this by population (in millions) and then take the natural log.6 The Democrat Republic of the 
Congo and Niger experienced the highest incidence of epidemics over the 1991-2015 time period 
and Niger also had the most affected cases. Also, the correlation between Shadow and 
EpidemINC and EpidemDIFF is approximately 0.24.  
The other variables used in the analysis are from reputed international sources that are 
routinely used in the literature. Complete details about variable definitions, summary statistics 
and data sources are provided in Table 1. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Baseline results 
We test the impact of EpidemINC and EpidemDIFF on the shadow economy and present the 
baseline regression estimates in Models 2.1 and 2.2 of Table 2, respectively. This enables us to 
verify the validity of hypothesis H1. 
The results show that the coefficient on EpidemINC is positive and statistically significant at 
the 5% level, thereby suggesting that the presence of epidemics increase the size of the shadow 
economy. Epidemics prompt individuals and firms to move underground as a means to maintain 
operations and earn income. Furthermore, during epidemics, the focus of nations likely shifts 
away from controlling the shadow economy, which lowers the expected costs of operating 
 
5 The number of deaths caused by the epidemic is another potential measure of the severity; however, a deadlier 
disease is one that has less time to spread. Therefore, we prefer to use the number affected to capture severity and 
likely has a more direct impact on the spread of the shadow economy. 
6 Similar transformations have been used by the extant literature (see, e.g., Kahn (2005) and Healy and Malhotra 
(2010)). 
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underground. Numerically speaking, the occurrence of an epidemic increases the size of the 
shadow economy by 1.32 percentage points. This finding thus confirms our hypothesis H1 that 
epidemics are positively linked with shadow development. 
Next, we turn to assess the severity of epidemics on underground participation. This 
consideration enables us to account for nations that are dissimilarly impacted by epidemics. The 
coefficient on EpidemDIFF is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. These 
findings imply that nations that have more individuals affected by epidemics experience a larger 
underground sector. Besides the reasons mentioned above, with a large diffusion of the disease, 
networking and demonstration might play a role in inducing movement underground. 
Furthermore, the onset of epidemics might induce migration by some of the people in affected 
areas, and this might contribute to the underground sector (Goel et al. (2020)).  In terms of 
magnitude, the underground economy increases by about 2.1 percent with a 10 percent increase 
in the number of individuals affected (per million population). These results continue to highlight 
that the occurrence of an epidemic and the severity (or intensity) of the epidemic promote 
shadow sector activities. 
Turning to the control variables, the coefficients on ECgrowth, BureauQual, and 
EconFreedom are negative, whereas the coefficient on PolFreedom is positive, all at the 1% 
level of significance. As expected, prosperous countries have strengthened enforcement and 
higher opportunity costs of operating underground. Furthermore, the quality of government 
bureaucracy, and institutions that support policies to promote economic freedom curb 
underground participation. Greater political freedom or a higher degree of democracy is tied to a 
due legal process, which is often lengthy. This delay lowers the expected value of punishment 
for operating underground.     
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The coefficient on GovtSize is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
suggests that nations with larger governments have a lower incidence of shadow activity. This is 
consistent with the notion that a larger government also has some resources devoted to 
enforcement, which lowers the prevalence of the shadow economy. Overall, the results for the 
control variables are broadly consistent with the literature (e.g., Dreher et al. (2009); Goel and 
Nelson (2016); Berdiev et al. (2018)). 
To tests the validity of our results, we conduct several robustness checks to account for the 
following: the potential impact of outliers, the possible simultaneity between epidemics and the 
shadow economy, additional control variables, and the potential simultaneity between economic 
growth and the shadow economy. Furthermore, we also address potential heterogeneity by 
splitting the sample into non-island, non-OECD and OECD nations. The regression estimates for 
the robustness checks are reported in Models 2.3-2.8 of Table 2, Tables 3 and 4. 
 
4.2. Considering additional control variables 
As our first robustness check, we account for additional control variables, namely, the 
strength of the rule of law (RuleLaw), the unemployment rate (UNEMP) and the level of 
education (EDUC). A consistent rule of law increases the potential punishments for breaking the 
law and we would expect nations with a strengthened rule of law to have a smaller shadow 
economy, ceteris paribus (e.g., Torgler and Schneider (2009); Dreher et al. (2009)). Greater 
educational attainment promotes understanding and adherence to the laws, while making entry 
into the formal labor force easier (e.g., Loayza et al. (2009); Berdiev and Saunoris (2018)). Both 
of these factors would check the informal sectors. Finally, the unemployed have a higher 
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propensity to enter the informal sector (e.g., Dell’Anno and Solomon (2008); Bajada and 
Schneider (2009)). 
We add these additional control variables one at a time to our baseline models and report the 
results in Table 2, Models 2.3-2.8. First of all, the positive impact of epidemics on the shadow 
economy that was shown in the baseline models, remains and is statistically significant for both 
EpidemINC and EpidemDIFF in all models. Thus, both the incidence and the intensity of 
epidemics contribute to the spread of shadow operations, and these results withstand the 
inclusion of additional covariates.7 
Furthermore, the results for unemployment and education are consistent with intuition (albeit 
fail to gain statistical traction at conventional levels of significance) – greater educational 
attainment reduces the size of the shadow economy (Models 2.7-2.8), while greater 
unemployment has the opposite effect (Models 2.5-2.6). The result for the rule of law, showing 
the expected negative and statistically significant effect, implies that countries with a 
strengthened rule of law curb underground participation (Models 2.3-2.4). The results with 
respect to the other controls closely support the baseline models (Models 2.1-2.2). 
 
4.3. Accounting for the potential impact of outliers 
It is possible that some nations might have abnormally high/low rates of epidemic diffusion 
or of the shadow economy. These large variations in the spread of epidemics are also evident in 
the current case of COVID-19 (https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html). Accordingly, as a 
robustness check, we account for the possible influence of outliers employing robust regressions. 
 
7 We also checked the robustness of these findings by considering additional covariates including a measure of 
regulatory quality, population density, and exports as a percentage of GDP. These results, not reported here but 
available upon request, continue to support our baseline models. 
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In particular, robust regression corrects for outliers by utilizing Cook’s distance less than one and 
conducts Huber iterations and then biweight iterations (see Li (1985)). 
We re-estimate the baseline equations using robust regression and present the results in 
Models 3.1-3.2 of Table 3. The results continue to show that the coefficients on EpidemINC and 
EpidemDIFF are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, thus supporting the 
baseline findings that the presence and intensity of epidemics are positively associated with the 
shadow economy. The results for the control variables are in line with our earlier findings. 
 
4.4. Accounting for the potential simultaneity between epidemics and the shadow economy 
It is possible that there are reverse feedbacks from the shadow economy to epidemics – for 
instance, nations with a large shadow economy (since the informal sector operators do not follow 
health and safety regulations and are not monitored), might have a larger incidence and diffusion 
of epidemics. 
To mitigate concerns with endogeneity, we, therefore, employ the lagged values of 
EpidemINC and EpidemDIFF and re-estimate the baseline specifications. The results, displayed 
in Models 3.3 and 3.4 of Table 3, show that the coefficients on lagged values of EpidemINC and 
EpidemDIFF are positive and statistically significant at conventional levels, thereby confirming 
our baseline results. This also suggests that the impact of epidemics on the shadow economy 
persists over time, which is in line with the reasoning of Jordá et al. (2020). The results for the 
remainder of the variables are consistent with our baseline findings. 
 
4.5. Accounting for the potential simultaneity between growth and the shadow economy 
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Economic growth is an overarching measure with potentially numerous linkages. Thus, a 
useful test of the validity of our findings should address the possible simultaneity between 
economic growth and the shadow economy that might bias our results. A large shadow economy 
might promote growth and development by, for example, providing complementary goods and 
services (e.g. sub-contracting) or it might deter growth by undermining the government’s ability 
to collect tax revenues that are used to finance growth-supporting public goods  (see Schneider 
and Enste (2000) and Goel et al. (2019) for a discussion). Furthermore, most of the other control 
variables could have a relation with economic growth. 
To alleviate issues with reverse causality between economic growth and the shadow 
economy, we re-estimate the baseline models without the control variable ECgrowth and present 
the corresponding results in Models 3.5 and 3.6 of Table 3.8 The coefficients on EpidemINC and 
EpidemDIFF remain positive and statistically significant, thereby instilling confidence in our 
baseline findings – again, as hypothesized, epidemics feed the informal sector. As before, the 
control variables show similar influences on the shadow economy. 
 
4.6. Accounting for country-specific characteristics 
As our next robustness check, we account for unique country-specific characteristics that 
may impact the relationship between epidemics and the shadow economy. For example, cultural 
differences that are mostly fixed over our time of study likely influence the spread of epidemics 
and the size of the shadow economy. To check the robustness of our main results to country-
specific heterogeneity, we re-estimate the baseline models controlling for country-fixed effects. 
 
8 As an additional robustness check, we also considered the lagged value of ECgrowth in the baseline models. Re-
estimating the baseline models with the lagged value of ECgrowth confirmed our main findings – these results are 
available upon request.  
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These results are reported as Models 3.7 and 3.8 in Table 3. The coefficients on EpidemINC 
and EpidemDIFF retain their sign and significance, albeit slightly smaller in magnitude relative 
to the baseline models. Furthermore, the control variables maintain their sign and significance 
with the important exception that government size is no longer statistically significant. Thus, 
while the variable government size is no longer significant when country-specific characteristics 
are accounted for, our main hypothesis is still supported.    
 
4.7. Accounting for heterogeneous effects related to income and geography  
In spite of the different controls that we employ to capture cross-country variations, it is 
possible that some of the structural and institutional differences cannot be readily quantified. As 
a result, we consider different samples of nations to shed additional light on the results – see 
Table 1A for each sub-sample of countries. To this end, we split the sample of countries into 
non-OECD and OECD countries. Additionally, we account for the unique geography of non-
island relative to island nations. Island nations have natural barriers against the spread of 
epidemics from other nations, and they are also somewhat insulated from shadow economy 
spillovers from neighboring nations (Goel and Saunoris (2014); Berdiev and Saunoris (2020)). 
On the other hand, the OECD group of nations is quite prosperous and has strengthened 
institutions which might help fight epidemics and control the shadow economy as well. In our 
overall sample of 129 nations, there were 109 non-island nations and 31 OECD nations. 
The results, replicating the baseline models from Table 2, are presented in Table 4. We find 
that the emergence and severity of an epidemic is positively associated with the size of the 
shadow economy in non-island (Models 4.1 and 4.2). This suggests that non-island nations are 
similar to the overall sample – there remains the positive influence of epidemics on the 
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prevalence of the shadow economy, and this is true both for the incidence and the diffusion of 
epidemics. On the other hand, non-island nations, Models 4.3-4.4, did not see any appreciable 
impact on the shadow economy from epidemics. This could be because there is relatively better 
monitoring of informal activities, fewer informal sector opportunities, or a lack of spillovers 
from immediate neighbors in such nations. 
The impacts of epidemics are again similar for the non-OECD group (Models 4.5 and 4.6).  
However, we find interesting differences for the OECD nations – both the incidence and 
intensity of epidemics have no appreciable impact on the shadow economy in OECD nations 
(Models 4.7 and 4.8). This is likely due to strengthened institutions and greater opportunity costs 
of operating in the illegal shadow sector in these nations. Further, the wealthier nations are able 
to provide relatively more generous fiscal support to the general public in times of 
epidemics/crisis. Therefore, while in the current COVID-19 crisis, the wealthier nations seem to 
be no less impacted than other nations in terms of the health impacts, they may be somewhat 
better insulated in terms of the spillovers on the shadow or the underground sector.  
Overall, in terms of spillovers on the shadow economy from epidemics, the OECD nations 
and island nations are similar, while the group of non-OECD nations is similar to the non-island 
group. This has some implications for cross-national policy coordination.  
The results from the robustness checks largely confirm the validity of our baseline findings 
that the occurrence of epidemics and the severity of epidemics drive entrepreneurs underground. 
The concluding section follows. 
 
5. Conclusions 
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The current coronavirus crisis has added a sense of urgency to related effective health and 
economic policies (https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.html; 
https://www.weforum.org/covid-action-platform). The scale and scope of the unexpected events 
have challenged resources and policymakers. Academics are also trying to respond to this 
challenge by providing new insights, although all related data for many analyses will only 
emerge over time. 
Whereas numerous drivers of the shadow economy have been considered in the literature 
(Gërxhani (2004); Goel and Nelson (2016); Schneider and Enste (2000)), the consideration of 
spillovers from epidemics is new. The informal sector undermines compliance with government 
regulations and lowers tax collections. Our main hypothesis is that epidemics positively impact 
the spread of the shadow economy, and we consider both the incidence of epidemics and their 
intensity (in terms of afflictions).  
Using panel data on nearly 130 nations and nesting the empirical analysis in the broader 
literature on the drivers of the shadow sector, we find that both the incidence and the intensity of 
epidemics positively and significantly contribute to the spread of the underground sector. 
Numerically, a ten percent increase in the intensity of epidemics leads to an increase in the 
prevalence of the shadow economy by about 2.1 percent. These main findings withstand 
alternative considerations of possible simultaneity, outliers, subsamples of nations, and different 
sets of controls. The other results regarding the influence of economic and political freedoms 
largely support the literature. 
These findings about the spillovers from epidemics have implications for economic policies 
in the current times, contributing to the renewed academic interest in the economics epidemics 
(Baldwin and di Mauro (2020), Folgi and Veldkamp (2019), Rasul (2020)). In particular, in the 
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present COVID-19 era, while government efforts are primarily directed towards containment and 
treatment of the virus, it would behoove policymakers to pay some attention to spillovers on 
economic activities, such as the shadow economy. One specific policy implication might be that 
island nations and OECD could have similar policies for containment of the informal sector 
following epidemics. Such attention to the informal sector is important because a greater shadow 
economy limits government resources which would undermine the fight for future diseases, and 
the containment of current ones due to lax adherence with health and safety regulations.  
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Table 1: Variable definitions, data sources, and summary statistics 
Variable Description [observations; mean; standard deviation] 
 
Source 
Shadow The size of the shadow economy as a percent of GDP measured using the multiple 
indicators, multiple causes (MIMIC) method. [3950; 32.28; 12.52]  
Medina and 
Schneider (2017) 
EpidemINC Dummy variable equal to 1 for the country and year in which there was an epidemic 
between 1991-2015, and zero otherwise. Epidemics caused by infectious diseases that 
are categorized as viral, bacterial, fungal or prion. [5919; 0.14; 0.35] 
Emergency Events 
Database# 
EpidemDIFF The log of one plus the total number affected each year between 1991-2015 (i.e. 100 
or more people that are affected, injured or homeless as a result of the epidemic) by 
the pandemic divided by population (in millions). [5788; 0.56; 1.77]   
Emergency Events 
Database# 
ECgrowth Economic growth measured as the log difference of per capital real GDP per capita. 
[4917; 1.88; 6.11]  
The World Bank 
(2018) 
PolFreedom Index of political freedom measured as the sum of civil liberties and political rights. 
This index is based on a scale from 2 to 14, with higher numbers denoting more 
political freedom. [4962; 6.83; 3.98]  
Freedom House 
BureauQual Index bureaucratic quality, measuring the strength and quality of bureaucracy on 0-4 
scale, with higher numbers denoting a higher quality. [3391; 2.19; 1.14]   
The PRS Group 
GovtSize Government size, measured as government final consumption expenditures as a 
percent of GDP. [4307; 20.87; 9.10]   
The World Bank 
(2018) 
EconFreedom Index of economic freedom on a scale from 0 to 100, with higher numbers denoting 
more freedom. [3533; 59.22; 11.84]    
Heritage Foundation 
(2017) 
RuleLaw Index of the rule of law on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher numbers denoting 
stronger rule of law. This is a perceptions based index capturing the text to which 
people abide by the rules of society, quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
police, courts and the likelihood of crime. [3752; 0.00; 1.00] 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2016) 
UNEMP Unemployment rate (%). [4810; 8.69; 6.38] The World Bank 
(2018) 
EDUC Primary school enrollment as a percent of gross enrollment. [4062; 100.28; 17.12] The World Bank 
(2018) 
Notes: Summary statistics based on all available data from 1991 to 2015. # Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) from the Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED, www.cred.be). 
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Table 2: Epidemics and the shadow economy: Baseline and extended models 
Dependent variable: Shadow 
 Baseline models Robustness check R1: Alternate control variables 
 (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6) (2.7) (2.8) 
EpidemINC 1.320**  1.048*  1.334**  1.100*  
 (0.545)  (0.581)  (0.545)  (0.611)  
EpidemDIFF  0.275***  0.247**  0.278***  0.252** 
  (0.104)  (0.115)  (0.104)  (0.116) 
ECgrowth -0.142*** -0.131*** -0.137*** -0.125** -0.142*** -0.131*** -0.116** -0.103* 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.053) (0.054) (0.049) (0.050) (0.053) (0.054) 
PolFreedom 0.450*** 0.433*** 0.085 0.071 0.456*** 0.440*** 0.434*** 0.421*** 
 (0.080) (0.081) (0.103) (0.105) (0.081) (0.082) (0.092) (0.094) 
BureauQual -3.504*** -3.641*** -1.967*** -2.126*** -3.495*** -3.630*** -3.814*** -3.965*** 
 (0.278) (0.283) (0.330) (0.336) (0.278) (0.284) (0.305) (0.311) 
GovtSize -0.202*** -0.208*** -0.130*** -0.130*** -0.205*** -0.210*** -0.257*** -0.266*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.031) (0.032) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.031) 
EconFreedom -0.169*** -0.167*** -0.005 -0.006 -0.167*** -0.166*** -0.092*** -0.087*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.035) (0.036) (0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.030) 
RuleLaw   -4.756*** -4.668***     
   (0.561) (0.571)     
UNEMP     0.021 0.021   
     (0.031) (0.032)   
EDUC       -0.015 -0.013 
       (0.012) (0.013) 
Elasticity         
EpidemDIFF  0.207***  0.177**  0.210***  0.177** 
  (0.078)  (0.082)  (0.078)  (0.082) 
         
Observations 2,492 2,430 2,057 2,004 2,492 2,430 2,168 2,113 
Number of countries 129 129 129 129 129 129 128 128 
R-squared 0.560 0.563 0.580 0.583 0.560 0.563 0.538 0.542 
Notes: See Table 1 for variable details. Regional fixed-effects and a constant are included in each model, but not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Asterisks denote the following significance levels:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1.
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Table 3: Epidemics and the shadow economy: Robustness checks 
Dependent variable: Shadow 
Robustness checks → R2: Robust Regression R3: Simultaneity R4: No Growth R5: Country heterogeneity 
 (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6) (3.7) (3.8) 
         
EpidemINC 1.157**    1.381**  0.808***  
 (0.456)    (0.546)  (0.244)  
EpidemDIFF  0.297***    0.293***  0.102** 
  (0.090)    (0.103)  (0.046) 
EpidemINCt-1   0.945*      
   (0.546)      
EpidemDIFFt-1    0.203**     
    (0.102)     
ECgrowth -0.092** -0.080* -0.145*** -0.149***   -0.111*** -0.109*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.048) (0.048)   (0.024) (0.024) 
PolFreedom 0.476*** 0.459*** 0.449*** 0.426*** 0.456*** 0.438*** 0.406** 0.390* 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.080) (0.081) (0.080) (0.081) (0.201) (0.202) 
BureauQual -2.930*** -3.028*** -3.512*** -3.662*** -3.434*** -3.578*** -1.540*** -1.525*** 
 (0.248) (0.251) (0.278) (0.284) (0.277) (0.283) (0.582) (0.571) 
GovtSize -0.251*** -0.258*** -0.204*** -0.212*** -0.202*** -0.207*** 0.053 0.043 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.062) (0.063) 
EconFreedom -0.210*** -0.206*** -0.170*** -0.170*** -0.164*** -0.163*** -0.229*** -0.232*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.066) (0.066) 
         
Observations 2,492 2,430 2,492 2,431 2,492 2,430 2,492 2,430 
Number of countries 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 
R-squared 0.574 0.579 0.559 0.562 0.558 0.562 0.119 0.115 
Notes: See Table 1 for variable details. Models 3.1-3.6 include regional fixed-effects, and Models 3.7-3.8 account for country fixed-effects. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. Asterisks denote the following significance levels:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
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Table 4: Epidemics and the shadow economy: Considering different groups of nations 
Dependent variable: Shadow 
Sample  Non-Island  Island Non-OECD OECD 
 (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6) (4.7) (4.8) 
         
EpidemINC 1.493**  0.914  1.651***  1.157  
 (0.590)  (1.189)  (0.580)  (0.706)  
EpidemDIFF  0.279**  0.172  0.291***  0.321 
  (0.111)  (0.225)  (0.105)  (0.204) 
ECgrowth -0.126** -0.118** -0.323*** -0.299*** -0.205*** -0.190*** -0.046 -0.054 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.095) (0.098) (0.056) (0.057) (0.059) (0.059) 
PolFreedom 0.648*** 0.629*** 0.374** 0.377** 0.421*** 0.409*** 2.243*** 2.220*** 
 (0.089) (0.090) (0.158) (0.162) (0.087) (0.088) (0.524) (0.524) 
BureauQual -3.477*** -3.632*** 0.295 0.223 -2.363*** -2.535*** -5.797*** -5.761*** 
 (0.292) (0.297) (0.881) (0.915) (0.317) (0.325) (0.475) (0.478) 
GovtSize -0.206*** -0.211*** -0.067 -0.076 -0.198*** -0.207*** 0.177*** 0.170*** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.097) (0.099) (0.029) (0.030) (0.039) (0.039) 
EconFreedom -0.126*** -0.124*** -0.632*** -0.629*** -0.131*** -0.129*** -0.242*** -0.243*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.058) (0.060) (0.030) (0.030) (0.038) (0.038) 
         
Observations 2,117 2,066 375 364 1,859 1,798 633 632 
Number of countries 109 109 20 20 98 98 31 31 
R-squared 0.545 0.548 0.758 0.759 0.381 0.383 0.585 0.584 
Notes: See Table 1 for variable details. Regional fixed-effects and a constant are included in each model, but not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Asterisks denote the following significance levels:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1A: Countries used in the analysis 
 
Albania Ecuador Lebanon Russian Federation 
Algeria Egypt, Arab Rep. Liberia Saudi Arabia 
Angola El Salvador Libya Senegal 
Argentina Estonia* Lithuania Sierra Leone 
Armenia Finland* Luxembourg* Singapore^ 
Australia* France* Madagascar^ Slovak Republic* 
Austria* Gabon Malawi Slovenia* 
Azerbaijan Gambia, The Malaysia South Africa 
Bahamas, The^ Germany* Mali Spain* 
Bahrain^ Ghana Malta^ Sri Lanka^ 
Bangladesh Greece* Mexico Suriname 
Belarus Guatemala Moldova Sweden* 
Belgium* Guinea Mongolia Switzerland* 
Bolivia Guinea-Bissau Morocco Tanzania 
Botswana Guyana Mozambique Thailand 
Brazil Haiti^ Myanmar Togo 
Brunei Darussalam^ Honduras Namibia Trinidad and Tobago^ 
Bulgaria Hungary* Netherlands* Tunisia 
Burkina Faso Iceland*^ New Zealand*^ Turkey 
Cameroon India Nicaragua Uganda 
Canada* Indonesia^ Niger Ukraine 
Chile Iran, Islamic Rep. Nigeria United Arab Emirates 
China Ireland*^ Norway* United Kingdom*^ 
Colombia Israel* Oman United States* 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Italy* Pakistan Uruguay 
Congo, Rep. Jamaica^ Papua New Guinea^ Venezuela, RB 
Costa Rica Japan*^ Paraguay Vietnam 
Cote d'Ivoire Jordan Peru Yemen, Rep. 
Croatia Kazakhstan Philippines^ Zambia 
Cyprus^ Kenya Poland* Zimbabwe 
Czech Republic* Korea, Rep.* Portugal*  
Denmark* Kuwait Qatar  
Dominican Republic^ Latvia Romania  
 
Notes: N = 129. * denotes OECD countries (31) and ^ denotes island countries (20). 
 
